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*Honorable Arthur L. Alarcòn, Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 04-3613
___________
GERALD A. LECHLITER,
               Appellant
 v.
DONALD H. RUMSFELD, Honorable, Secretary of Defense;
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; THOMAS E. WHITE, Honorable,
Secretary of the Army
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-00098)
District Judge:  The Honorable Kent Jordan
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 28, 2006
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, and NYGAARD,  Circuit Judge,
 and ALARCÒN,  Circuit Judge.*
(Filed May 23, 2006 )
2___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Lechliter is a veteran of the United States Army.  He has filed a
pro se lawsuit seeking “special compensation” under 10 U.S.C. Section 1413 for one
month – May, 2001, a month in which he was100% disabled, but a month in which he did
not receive corresponding disability benefits.
Section 1413 provides that a military retiree is entitled to payment “for any
month for which the retiree has a qualifying service-connected disability.”  Under
Defense Department regulations, to be eligible for any Section 1413 compensation (or
increase) for a given month, the retiree must be entitled to and in receipt of DVA
disability pay.  The District Court determined that the Appellant was not entitled to an
increase in the special compensation until June 2001, and granted summary judgment for
the Department of Defense.  We will affirm
I.
It is axiomatic that we have an obligation to examine the basis for our
jurisdiction in every case, even when jurisdiction is not contested by the parties. 
Therefore, we asked the parties to address the question of whether this appeal should be
transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  In the District
Court, the Government had argued that Lechliter’s claims arose, at least in part, under the
*. The so-called Big Tucker Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 and grants the
Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction over similar monetary claims against the
United States regardless of the amount at stake.
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Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.  The Little Tucker Act confers concurrent
jurisdiction over certain claims against the United States on both the district courts and
the United States Court of Federal Claims. With certain exceptions not relevant here, that
Act provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent
with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of:
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States,
not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000).  *
The District Court concluded that Lechliter was not seeking monetary
damages, but rather equitable relief and to enforce the statute.  As such, it held that
Lechliter’s cause of action arose under the Administrative Procedures Act.  We agree
with the District Court.  Here, Lechliter seeks what he believed he was entitled to under
the 10 U.S.C. § 1413.  As we have indicated, where a plaintiff  “seeks only that to which
[he] is entitled . . ., the relief requested is ‘other than monetary damages.’”  See Zellous v.
Broadhead Assocs., 906 F.2d 94, 99 (3  Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  The Districtrd
Court had jurisdiction under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.  We have jurisdiction over
4final decisions of district courts that have reviewed agency determinations pursuant to the
APA.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Shulman v. J.P. Morgan Investment Mgmt., Inc., 35 F.3d
799, 803 (1994).
II.  
The following material facts are not disputed by the parties:
1. Lechliter was rated at greater than seventy percent disabled by the
Department of Veteran’s Affairs within four years of his retirement,
was eligible for and received § 1413 “special compensation”
2. Lechliter was initially rated at eighty percent disabled and
accordingly, received “special compensation” in the amount of
$100.00 per month
3. The effective date of increase in Lechliter’s disability rating (from
80% to 100%) was May 1, 2001
4. Lechliter began receiving increased benefits as a result of his
increase in disability rating one month following the effective date of
his increased rating, June 1, 2001.
5. Lechliter has been receiving $300.00 per month in “special
compensation” since June 1, 2001.
The only issue before us on review is whether the Department of Defense’s interpretation
of § 1413 was proper.  We hold that it was.
510 U.S.C. § 1413 is silent on the question of when these “special
compensation” payments are to be made.  Instead, the section only directed that “the
amount be paid.”  This issue, therefore becomes one implicating Chevron, U.S.A.  Inc., v.
National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  Under Chevron,
we must determine whether the Department of Defense’s interpretation of the statute is
reasonable.  467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  This is a very deferential standard. 
Furthermore, when it comes to matters of military pay, “to prevail, a plaintiff must
overcome the strong, but rebuttable presumption that administrators of the military, like
other public officers, discharge their duties correctly, lawfully and in good faith.”  Doe v.
United States, 132 F.3d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Sanders v. United States,
594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  All of this is in accord with long-standing
jurisprudence affording wide deference to the military.  See e.g. Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft,
330 F.3d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 2003); Kreis v. Secretary of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (decisions regarding military personnel are reviewed under APA
by an unusually deferential application of the arbitrary and capricious standards).    
Since Section 1413 is silent on the question of when “special
compensation” is to be paid, the Department of Defense interpreted the provision to apply
to those retired military personnel who are in actual receipt of the disability benefit.  This
interpretation has subsequently been adopted as Chapter 62 of the Department of Defense
Financial Management Regulations.  See DoDFMR, Ch. 62, para 620302.  We find this to
6be a reasonable interpretation of Section 1413 because it guarantees that “special
compensation” be available only to disabled veterans whose retirement pay is subject to
offset due to concurrent receipt of disability benefits. The record reflects that Lechliter
was not in receipt of § 1413 compensation until June of 2001, which is when his § 1431
compensation began.  Therefore, he is not entitled to receive the additional $200.00
payment.
III.
In sum, the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that Lechliter
cannot demonstrate on this record that the Department of Defense acted arbitrarily or
capriciously or without sufficient evidentiary support in denying his claim for $300.00 for
the month of May, 2001.  The order of the District Court will be affirmed.
